The first Congress-in its first session-expressly gave federal courts the power to grant writs of habeas corpus to prisoners in federal custody.
3 4 That act did not permit federal courts to grant writs to prisoners in state custody. 35 The reach of habeas at the time of the founding is still debated. 36 However, at the very least, "the writ was subject to restrictions developed in the common law."
37

C. Nineteenth Century
Throughout the early nineteenth century, Congress gradually expanded statutory access to the writ. For example, in 1833, Congress allowed state prisoners held for an act that they committed pursuant to federal law to seek a writ. 3 After the Civil War, Congress again expanded the reach of the writ when it enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867.
3 ' For the first time, federal courts had the power to grant writs of habeas corpus when "any person [is] . . . restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the [C]onstitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States." 4°T hus, the1867 Act broadened federal judicial authority and allowed federal courts to review state court judgments imposed in violation of federal (not state) law. 41 In the 1870s and 1880s, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the 1867 Act in several cases, ultimately concluding that the 1867 Act provided a fairly broad scope of review of criminal convictions and sentences. o Id. (emphasis added); see also Choper &Yoo, supra note 38, at 1280 (citing § 1, 14 Stat. at 385) ("Congress did not expand habeas to include cases where prisoners claimed they were held in violation of federal rights until 1867."). For an analysis of habeas corpus jurisprudence during Reconstmcrion, see Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 596-629 (1993). 41 See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. at 385; see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 12, § 28.1(b) (discussing how the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 broadened the authority of federal courts).
' See KING &HOFFMANN, supra note 16, at 108-09 (discussing how § 2255 offered an alternative to habeas for federal prisoners). [2014] [2015] held that the 1867 Act permitted habeas relief where the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated, 43 where the defendant was charged with violating an unconstitutional statute," and where the petitioner was convicted without an indictment from a grand jury.
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D. Twentieth Century
Congress's objectives in adopting the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 were (and still are) hotly debated. 46 In the 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation of the 1867 Act's purposes. 47 In so doing, the Court noted that the writ was capable of growth to meet "changed conceptions of the kind of criminal proceedings so fundamentally defective as to make imprisonment pursuant to them constitutionally intolerable." 48 But-as seems to be the only constant with habeas jurisprudence-the tide turned. And, by the mid-1970s, the Court began to narrow its interpretation of the habeas statute. 49 This trend continued throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. 47 Now that we have reviewed that history and understand some of the key components of the 1867 Act (i.e., § 2241), we are equipped to understand its statutory sister (and the heart of this article): 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A. Section 2255's Purpose: Relieve the Statutory Writ's Venue Limitations
The 1867 Act required a prisoner to file her writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court having jurisdiction over her place of confinement.
5 Though seemingly innocuous, this venue requirement created problems. First, it resulted in a work-allocation imbalance: federal habeas petitions inundated the dockets of those few federal courts whose divisions had federal prisons. 56 Id. at 213-14 (noting that judges in districts containing "major federal penal institutions ... were required to handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions far from the scene of the facts, the homes of the witnesses and records of the sentencing court[s]"). The Supreme Court in Hayman noted that, at the time of § 2255's enactment, sixty-three percent of habeas petitions filed by federal prisoners were filed in only five district courts. Id. at 214 n.18. physical-proximity problem: given that federal prisons-and, thus, habeas courts-were often far from the sentencing court, habeas petitioners had limited access to relevant records, witnesses, and evidence.
7
To disperse the workload associated with collateral attacks more evenly and to ensure that the proceedings would be conducted in closer proximity to the relevant records and witnesses, the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus Procedure s " proposed a bill to Congress that would require that federal prisoners first challenge their convictions and sentences in the court that sentenced them.
9
In 1948, Congress took up and passed that bill, which was codified (and remains codified) at 28 U.S.C. § 2255.60
Once enacted, § 2255 provided an alternative to the statutory writ of habeas corpus by allowing federal prisoners to attack their convictions and sentences through a motion "to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence."
61 This motion applied (and still applies) to any situation in which a federal prisoner may raise a collateral attack.
62
Section 2255 is a practical alternative to the statutory writ's venue limitations. Although § 2255's statutory language suggests that a § 2255 motion can only challenge the sentence itself, the portion of § 2255 that governs the granting of relief indicates otherwise. It allows the court to "set the judgment aside and . . . discharge the prisoner."
7° Given this language-and in light of the legislative history surrounding § 2255-the term "sentence" is treated as a generic term that includes all of the proceedings leading up to the sentence. " Therefore, using a § 2255 motion, a prisoner can attack the conviction underlying her sentence and the proceedings that resulted in that conviction.
7 2 A prisoner can also use a § 2255 motion to assert that (1) "the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States," (2) "the court was without jurisdiction to impose [the] sentence," (3) "the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law," or (4) the sentence "is otherwise subject to collateral attack." During this same time period-and in the face of growing concern and criticism regarding the ineffectiveness of habeas procedure-Chief Justice William Rehnquist created the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus in Capital Cases. 7 The committee explored the "the necessity and desirability of legislation directed toward avoiding delay and the lack of finality in capital cases."" s After its review, the committee issued a report noting several problems with the thenexisting federal habeas system. Problems highlighted by the committee included delay, repetition, and lack of finality.
s9 Despite a thorough review, the committee's report did not spark congressional action.
9
" But, as is often the case, a national tragedy did.
In 1996, one year after the terrorist attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
" According to Congress, AEDPA was intended to "curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases." 
").
s" Bellamy, supra note 85, at 10 n.70 (citing Lonchar, 517 U.S. at 333). 2008 ) ("Some of these constraints were temporal; for example, AEDPA established a one-year statute of limitations for filing a section 2255 petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Some of these constraints were numerical; for example, AEDPA required a federal prisoner who sought to prosecute a second or successive section 2255 petition to obtain pre-clearance, in the form of a certificate, from the court of appeals. Id. § 2255(h)."). 96 For a more exhaustive list of AEDPA's effect on habeas proceedings, see generally Blume, supra note 47. the fact of confinement).
1°7 By contrast, § 2241 provides an avenue for a federal prisoner to challenge the execution of his sentence (i.e., the conditions of confinement). ' For example, a prisoner can use a § 2241 petition to seek relief from things like prison conditions, disciplinary actions imposed by the prison warden, or decisions to deny parole. 9 In addition, § 2241 grants federal courts authority to entertain habeas petitions from prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."" 0 This language creates an apparent overlap between § 2255 and § 2241. Nevertheless, courts have consistently ruled that a federal prisoner "generally must invoke § 2255 instead of § 2241 to challenge a sentence as violating the U.S. Constitution or laws.""'
The remainder of this Article explores what happens in the non-standard situation; that is, when does § 2255(e) allow a federal prisoner to challenge his sentence in a § 2241 petition?
For nearly two decades, circuit courts have fumbled with the meaning of the twenty simple words at the end of § 2255(e), the so-called Savings Clause:" 2 An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate And, unsurprisingly, when left to their own devices, the circuit courts failed to agree on the Savings Clause's meaning. By charting paths shaped more by the peculiar contingencies of prior precedents than by the first principles of statutory construction, court developed "tests" and interpretations unique to each circuit, leaving federal prisoners geographically stratified-with some prisoners virtually unable to access § 2241 through § 2255's Savings Clause and other prisoners more .1. See, e.g., Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611 ('A federal prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus only if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after his first 2255 motion.").
119 See, e.g., Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1245 (holding "that the only sentencing claims that may conceivably be covered by the savings clause are those based upon a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision overturning circuit precedent."). 121 See, e.g., Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that the Savings Clause may be triggered where "the failure to allow for collateral review would raise serious constitutional questions"); see also, e.g., In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 248 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Were no other avenue of judicial review available for a party who claims that s/he is factually or legally innocent as a result of a previously unavailable statutory interpretation, we would be faced with a thorny constitutional issue.").
1 ' See generally Case, supra note 4 (providing several hypotheticals highlighting these disparities).
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Quite possibly-if the circuit courts had interpreted the Savings Clause by examining (1) the clause's text, (2) the text of the surrounding provision (i.e., § 2255(e)), and (3) the overall framework of § 2255-the courts would have reached similar conclusions (rather than irreconcilable tests) that applied to all federal prisoners, regardless of the physical location where the prisoners were sentenced or confined.
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The remainder of this Article attempts to do what the circuit courts repeatedly have not: consider the ordinary meaning of § 2255(e)'s text. Circuit courts have not made a full-throated attempt at interpreting the ordinary meaning of the provision's key terms, such as "inadequate," "ineffective," "test," and "detention." Believing such a task is possible-and necessary-let us begin.
V. TEXT-BASED INTERPRETATION OF § 2255(e)
A. Section 2255 Then and Now
Any good statutory interpretation journey begins by, well, reading the statute.1 23 In this case, the key first step is to examine both the text and structure of § 2255 as originally enacted and the textual and structural changes imposed thereafter.
Section 2255 originally had seven (7) unnumbered paragraphs. 1 24 With one minor exception not relevant to this article,' 12 the first, third, fourth, sixth, and seventh paragraphs remain in the current version of § 2255. As enacted, § 2255 stated:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If 
2014-2oi 5]
the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
12
Until it was modified by AEDPA in 1996, § 2255 remained unchanged. AEDPA removed the second and fifth paragraphs of § 2255 and added three (3) new paragraphs. 127 Specifically, AEDPA replaced a prisoner's ability to file a § 2255 motion for relief at "any time"
12 with a limited timeframe for filing such motions.
129 AEDPA also replaced the provision that a court "not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner"' 30 with strict limits on when a court can entertain second or successive petitions.' Finally, AEDPA added a provision to permit the appointment of counsel.
132
In its current form, § 2255 provides:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was ii excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence. [Vol. 103 (b) Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear appropriate.
(c) A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.
(d) An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
(e) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. Other than labeling the paragraphs (a) through (h) for ease of reference,'
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Congress has not changed the provisions of § 2255 since AEDPA was enacted. This Article provides the full text of § 2255 because one must appreciate the statute's structure and its various provisions to properly interpret the meaning of subsection (e).
B. Section 2255(e)
Section 2255(e) provides-as it always has:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.'
35
This language has not changed since it was originally enacted in 1948.136 However, since Congress added subsections (g) and (h) in 1996, the meaning of subsection (e) has perplexed federal courts.'
37
If one skips the statute's text and enters directly into the kaleidoscopic morass of meanings given to § 2255(e) by the circuit courts, it is easy to think that the statute's language is inherently ambiguous and amenable to an unlimited line of reasonable interpretations.
3 ' It is not.
Subsection (e)'s Authorization
Clause.-The first portion of subsection (e) states that "Ia]n application for a writ of habeas corpus ... shall not be entertained"
if (1) a prisoner failed to move the sentencing court for relief or (2) the sentencing court denied such relief.' 39 This is simple enough. A habeas court need only look at the sentencing court's docket to determine whether the petitioner filed a § 2255 motion and, if so, whether relief was denied.
However, there is more to this first portion of subsection (e)-cleverly hidden by the ellipses in the quoted portion above and often overlooked by circuit courts. Specifically, the ellipses cloak the fact that courts determine whether they can entertain a habeas petition only if a prisoner "is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section" (hereinafter "Authorization Clause"). 4 That is, subsection (e) operates to bar a § 2241 habeas petition only if § 2255 authorizes the prisoner to bring a § 2255 motion. Importantly, if the Authorization Clause is not satisfied, subsection (e) plays no role in determining whether a prisoner can bring his habeas petition. 14 1
Subsection (a):
Scope of the Motion.-To determine whether a prisoner is authorized to apply for relief pursuant to § 2255, one must look to the remainder of the statute. Subsection (a) allows any "prisoner in custody under sentence of a [federal] court" to bring a motion to "vacate, set aside, or correct" a sentence if (1) the "sentence was imposed in violation of [federal law]," (2) the sentencing court lacked "jurisdiction to impose the sentence," (3) the sentence exceeds "the maximum authorized by law," or (4) the sentence "is otherwise subject to collateral attack."
142 In short, a prisoner can bring a § 2255 motion to collaterally attack his sentence or the proceedings leading to that sentence. 43 Looking only at subsection (a), it is clear that subsection (e)'s Authorization Clause is satisfied by almost any challenge to a conviction or sentence because subsection (a) authorizes a prisoner to bring a § 2255 motion for a generously broad range of collateral attacks. Subsection (a) has existed since § 2255's inception.'
44 So, until Congress added temporal and numerical limitations to subsection (a) in 1996,14 the Authorization Clause inquiry was fairly straightforward: subsection (e)'s Authorization Clause was almost always satisfied by the expansive reach of subsection (a). But this is no longer the case. This all ended in 1996 when Congress enacted AEDPA, dramatically changed § 2255's framework, and, by extension, altered how one must read subsection (e). Post-AEDPA, multiple provisions of § 2255 (i.e., subsections (f) and (h)) limit the otherwise broadly permissive language of subsection (a).
Subsequent Amendments to
1°i
. Subsection (10: Limitations Period.-First, there is now a one-year limitations period: Subsection (f) requires that a prisoner bring his § 2255 motion within one year of several triggering events. 151 The most common triggering event is the date of the final judgment of conviction.
15 2 But, other triggering events can extend the limitations period. For example, the limitations period extends one year from the date that (1) a government-imposed impediment to bringing a § 2255 motion is removed; 5 3 (2) a newly recognized, retroactively applicable right is first recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court; 5 4 or (3) facts supporting the claim are diligently discovered. 155 Thus, in a post-AEDPA world, subsection (e)'s Authorization Clause is not satisfied "any time" that a § 2255 motion is filed.' 56 Instead, a prisoner's § 2255 motion must be timely.'
57 If the motion is timely (and other requirements, such as the limit on successive motions, are met), a prisoner is "authorized" to bring his motion pursuant to § 2255.15 In such a case, subsection (e) would plainly prohibit a prisoner from bringing a § 2241 habeas petition. Id. § 2255(0(1) (requiring that the judgment of conviction to be "final" before the limitations period begins to run). There are several things that determine finality; however, they are irrelevant for the purposes of this analysis. 1 Id. § 2255(f)(2) (requiring that the government's action be "in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States" and that the government's action have prevented filing the 2255 motion). 154 Id. § 2255(0(3) (requiring the right to be made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review). previously unavailable "rule of constitutional law" made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the U.S. Supreme Court.1
ii. Subsection (h): Limit on
60
If a prisoner secures certification from the appropriate appellate court (and other requirements, such as timeliness requirements, are met), subsection (e)'s Authorization Clause would be satisfied.' 61 In such case, a prisoner would be "authorized" to bring his motion pursuant to § 2255, and subsection (e) would plainly prohibit a prisoner from bringing hii § 2241 habeas petition.
In short, after AEDPA, a prisoner only makes his way past subsection (e)'s Authorization Clause to reach the remainder of that statutory provision if she makes a timely initial motion or if she makes a timely second or successive motion that is predicated on either newly discovered evidence or a new rule of constitutional law. In all other circumstances where a prisoner seeks to bring a § 2241 habeas petition, subsection (e)-by the plain language of its Authorization Clause-prohibits the prisoner from bringing that petition.
If that is true, how is it that the circuit courts reach such wildly different outcomes regarding the meaning of § 2255(e)? Quite simply, the courts skipped right past the Authorization Clause and jumped straight to the last twenty words of § 2255(e)-the so-called "Savings Clause." That is, the courts consistently and collectively assume that subsection (e) forbids all § 2241 petitions unless and until the Savings Clause applies.
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This is an incorrect interpretation of § 2255(e). Or, more precisely, it is a failure to even consider-much less interpret-critical statutory text.
Subsection (e)'s Savings
Clause.-The Savings Clause that the circuit courts have so desperately tried to parse contains these twenty words of subsection (e): "unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. " "' But, a reader who looks at subsection (e) in total reaches the Savings Clause only after reading almost sixty other relevant words and only if she first determines that the Authorization Clause is satisfied.
In its simplest form, subsection (e) bars a § 2241 habeas petition if the prisoner is authorized to bring that claim in a § 2255 motion "unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 164 Thus, there is at least a two-step inquiry: (1) Is the prisoner authorized to bring a § 2255 motion? Is so, she cannot bring a § 2241 habeas petition. (2) And, if the prisoner is so authorized, is the Savings Clause satisfied? If so, the prisoner may bring her § 2241 petition; if not, the prisoner remains barred from bringing the petition. Thus, a court reaches the Savings Clause only after it has first concluded that the Authorization Clause is satisfied.' With that framework in mind, interpreting the Savings Clause is fairly straight-forward: either a prisoner's authorized § 2255 motion is adequate and effective to test the legality of his detention-in which case the prisoner must bring his claim in a § 2255 motion-or it is not-in which case a prisoner is not precluded from bringing his § 2241 habeas petition.
Given this textual reading, the wrenching and wrestling that the circuit courts have done with the Savings Clause is simply unnecessary. And, lest the reader wonder when in the world a § 2255 motion could be "inadequate or ineffective," at least one circuit court has provided examples of the rare instances where an authorized § 2255 motion is truly inadequate to test the legality of one's detention.
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C. Other Textual Support
There are other textual clues that support this text-based interpretation of § 2255(e)-many of which the circuit courts have overlooked.
"Sentence" versus "Detention. '--On its face, § 2255 is a tool for challenging a sentence:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.' 67 But, courts have interpreted § 2255(a)'s use of the term "sentence" to include all proceedings leading to a sentence, including the actual conviction and the proceedings leading to that conviction. [Vol. 10 3
This understanding of the term "detention" comports with the separation of labor that Congress created between the court that sentenced a prisoner and the court in the district where the prisoner is confined (i.e., the habeas court). Congress's 1948 adoption of § 2255 did not impinge a prisoner's right to collaterally attack her sentence; it simply provided a new venue for the collateral attack.' 77 Thus, it makes sense that-through § 2255(e)-the only types of challenges that Congress allows to be brought (in the court whose only connection to the prisoner is its geographic proximity to the prison where the prisoner is confined) are challenges to that prisoner's "detention"-that is, challenges related to the very act of confinement itself. And, it makes sense that Congress requires that a prisoner bring all other attacks on her conviction or sentence in the court where the prisoner was actually adjudged guilty and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
"To Test" the Detention's
Legality.-A prisoner may file a habeas petition in the court geographically proximate to the place of his confinement if a remedy from an authorized § 2255 motion "is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention."' 7 This phrase is quite limited: "To test" means "to try" 179 or "to ascertain the truth or the quality or fitness of a thing."
180
Applying these definitions to the § 2255 context, it becomes clear that whether a prisoner may "test" a claim about the legality of his detention is separate from whether he wins or loses that claim. A prisoner can test his claim if he has an opportunity to raise that claim for examination. Thus, in the context of § 2255, "to test" the legality of one's detention means only that a prisoner needs the opportunity to raise an argument about the legality of his detention.' It does not mean that he is entitled to re-raise-or, more precisely, re-test-his argument if he loses his first challenge.
Returning to our text-based reading of § 2255(e): If a prisoner is authorized to file a § 2255 motion but somehow is unable to file that motion because, for example, the sentencing court has dissolved, the prisoner would be unable "to test"
... See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998) ("The purpose behind the enactment of section 2255 was to change the venue of postconviction proceedings brought by federal prisoners from the district of incarceration to the district in which the prisoner had been sentenced.").
178 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012) (emphasis added).
179 11 OED 1933 , supra note 173, at 220; accord 17 OED 1989, supra note 173, at 828 (defining "test" similarly in the edition applicable to the 1996 passage of AEDPA).
110 BLACK'S 1944, supra note 174, at 1720; accord BLACK'S 1990, supra note 174, at 1473 (defining "test" similarly in the edition applicable to the 1996 passage of AEDPA). [Vol. 103 the legality of his detention in a § 2255 motion."
8 2 In such case, § 225 5 (e) permits the prisoner to file a § 2241 petition to raise his claim.
One example of the inability to use § 2255 "to test" the legality of detention could occur when a claim is not cognizable in a § 2255 motion. If the claim is not cognizable, a prisoner cannot "test" it or obtain a "remedy," as stated in § 2255(e). For example, a prisoner cannot "test" a claim about the revocation of his parole in a § 2255 motion. Several circuit courts have conflated the prepositional phrase "to test" with the words "to win" or "likely to win." 88 But, § 2255(e) says nothing about what result may manifest from a § 2255 proceeding; it simply mandates that a remedy by an authorized § 2255 motion be adequate and effective "to test" the legality of a prisoner's detention." 189 Surely Congress did not intend to allow a federal prisoner to first challenge the legality of her sentence in the court that sentenced her (via § 2255) and then-if she was dissatisfied with the result of the § 2255 proceeding--to again challenge the legality of her sentence by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus in the districts that confined her (via § 2241). It is unlikely that § 2255(e)-whose text has been present and unaltered since § 2255's enactment-was intended to allow a prisoner dual opportunities to test her detention's legality (the so-called second bite at the apple). Such result would undermine the very purposes of § 2255-to disperse the workload of district courts evenly and to ensure that challenges to convictions and sentences occur in a venue that is most likely to have the best access to records, witnesses, and evidence. 9 ' Transforming the words "to test" to "to win" (or "likely 182 See id. at 588 (providing two examples in the Tenth Circuit for which § 2255 was inadequate or ineffective "to test" the legality of a sentence because the sentencing courts no longer existed). to win") would increase the federal workload by allowing the same challenge in two separate federal courts. That would indeed be an odd result.
3. The Linking Verb: "Is. '-Another textual mistake that the circuit courts often make when interpreting § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause is to replace the verb "is" with the word "was."' 9 ' As a reminder, the Savings Clause states: "unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention."' 92 Changing the operative verb from present to past tense necessarily changes the meaning of the clause.
When the linking verb is read (as Congress wrote it) in the present tense, the prisoner cannot access § 2241 unless § 2255 is--at the moment her § 2241 petition is filed in federal court-inadequate and ineffective to test the detention's legality.
And, § 2241 is only inadequate and ineffective in the rare instances already indicated in this Article. 193 But, when the linking verb is read (as the courts often read it) in the past tense, the prisoner can access § 2241 if § 2255 was-at any point in time-inadequate or ineffective to test her detention's legality. When read in the past-tense, the linking verb "is" allows the courts to create unwritten requirements for accessing § 2241.
For example, the Seventh Circuit allows a prisoner to access § 2241 via § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause where, inter alia, "binding precedent" foreclosed the claim at the time of the prisoner's first § 2255 proceeding.
way.' 95 The Seventh Circuit (and other circuits) can only have this retrospective view because they assume that the linking verb in § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause is written in the past tense. 196 If the circuit courts treat the verb as it is codified in the statute, they would have no statutory basis for their judicially-created rules that allow a prisoner to bring a second challenge to the legality of his sentence where a change in the law since the resolution of the earlier challenge may benefit the prisoner.' 97 For this reason, the textual distinction between "is" and "was" is extremely important.' 
D. Other Support for the Text-Based Interpretation
There are also several non-textual clues that support this article's proposed text-based interpretation of § 2255(e).
The proper defendant in a § 2241 petition, which challenges the execution of a sentence, is the warden who confines the prisoner. Thus, a prisoner who raises sentencing challenges in a § 2241 petition not only sues in the wrong court (i.e., by filing in the place of confinement rather than the place of sentencing), but she also sues the wrong defendant. The warden does not impose a prisoner's sentence or participate in any proceeding leading up to that sentence's imposition; the U.S. Attorney does. Reading § 2255(e) to allow a conviction-or-sentence-based challenge to pass through the Savings Clause in § 2255(e) and reach § 2241 puts the warden in the precarious position of defending the prisoner's conviction and sentence even though the warden did not participate in any proceeding leading up to the imposition of that sentence. This cannot be a result that Congress intended, and this Article's proposed reading of § 2255(e) largely avoids such a result.
2. AEDPA's Limitations.-Circuit courts attempting to harmonize their interpretation of § 2255(e) with the remainder of § 2255 have consistently faced a dilemma (whether they acknowledge it or not): the varied tests for allowing certain sentence-based claims to pass through § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause circumvent the bars to such motions that Congress explicitly imposed when it enacted AEDPA in 1996. In particular, Congress imposed a statute of limitations, replacing the old provision that allowed a motion to be filed at "any time. " 201 And Congress imposed a bar on second or successive motions, 2 0 2 which was intended "to place limits on federal collateral review."203
The proposed text-based interpretation of § 2255(e) avoids the problems that the circuit courts' interpretations have introduced.
20 4 Under this Article's reading of § 2255, the Savings Clause comes into play if and only if § 2255(e)'s Authorization Clause is first satisfied-that is, only when al requirements for such a motion, including the bars to untimely motions and second (or successive) motions, have been met. 2 0 ' This reading of § 2255(e) harmonizes all sections of § 2255 and is consistent with AEDPA's purposes to "curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus, and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in capital cases." 3. Avoiding Constitutional Issues.-Some courts have stated that § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause is necessary to avoid "a thorny constitutional issue" about the suspension of habeas corpus.
2 0 7 Taking this as true, the proposed text-based reading of § 2255(e) avoids such constitutional problems.
A prisoner challenging the execution of his sentence must have a forum where he may bring that challenge, even though such a challenge could be raised long after his sentence is imposed.
2 8 Because § 2255 clearly permits challenges to convictions and sentences, § 2255 would impose a constitutional problem only if it prevented a prisoner from challenging the execution of his sentence. But that is something § 2255 does not do.
Challenges regarding good-time credits, parole revocation, or other prison disciplinary proceedings affecting a prisoner's confinement are challenges about executive detention.
20 9 These challenges mirror challenges brought by pretrial detainees, who are the quintessential habeas petitioners because they have been detained-by the Executive branch before courts have determined their guilt. 21 0 Such challenges to executive detention were the very kinds of challenges that the Framers anticipated when they adopted the Suspension Clause more than 200 years ago. 21 ' And none of these challenges are barred by § 2255.212 Section 2255(e)'s Authorization Clause is not satisfied if a prisoner seeks to challenge the execution of his sentence because § 2255 is not the authorized mechanism to raise such challenges. 213 In such a case, the prisoner should file a § 2241 petition.214 Thus, the Constitution does not require courts to read new, non-text-based, escape hatches into § 2255(e). To the contrary, § 2255(e) permits challenges to the execution of one's sentence precisely because such challenges do not satisfy § 2255(e)'s Authorization Clause, and § 2255(e) permits challenges to the imposition of that sentence either through a § 2255 motion (or through a § 2241 petition if § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause is satisfied). That is all the Constitution requires. 
CONCLUSION
Courts have a "duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."
216 Yet when it comes to interpreting § 2255(e), circuit courts have repeatedly shirked that duty and imposed their own, individualized, multi-step, Rube Goldbergian rules to connect § 2255 motions and § 2241 petitions. 217 This Article proposes that we begin at the beginning, assume that Congress meant what it wrote, and impose the rules limiting access to § 2241 that Congress drafted into § 2255. If the circuit courts return to the basics of statutory interpretation, they will-in all likelihood-reach the same or similar results in their interpretive endeavors. That would benefit the judicial system because it would ensure similar access to justice regardless of the district of sentencing or the place of confinement.
Should Congress find that the effects of its own enacted words are contrary to its vision and too limiting in practice, Congress can amend § 2255 to create greater access to § 2241 when successive or untimely § 2255 motions are otherwise barred. Such statutory re-writing is beyond the role of the courts. Courts should stick to their mandate to interpret and apply the law that Congress enacted. Only then will we escape the kaleidoscopic chaos that was the inevitable result of establishing rules and requirements for access to § 2241 that were completely foreign to, and found nowhere in, the statutory text of § 2255. 214 See Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 535 (3d Cir. 2012) (stating that § 2241 "confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence" (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
215 And, in case more is required, nothing in § 2255 strangles the power of the U.S. Supreme Court to exercise its original jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus. Accord Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658-61 (1996) (rejecting the argument that AEDPA's restriction on second or successive § 2255 motions unconstitutionally infringes on its appellate jurisdiction because AEDPA "makes no mention of [the Supreme Court's] authority to hear habeas petitions filed as original matters in this Court").
216 United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 217 See generally Case, supra note 4 (explaining the various tests used in each circuit court).
